Briefing #132: How to Evaluate China’s Overseas Pro-Democracy Movement?

Dialogue China BriefingAbout China TodayJune 1st, 2023 – Issue 132In This IssueThe articles translated here do not necessarily reflect the views of Dialogue China Briefing or Dialogue China.
Feature Story:How to Evaluate the Criticism that “China’s Overseas Pro-Democracy Movement is Full of Factions and Internal Struggles”?


Think Tank Opinion:
Twenty Years of a Return to Farming, Twenty Years of a Return to Forests


Policy (Public Opinion within the Great Firewall):Most of China’s Agricultural Counties in the Midwest May Become Permanent Agricultural Counties

Three Major Events That Recently Occurred in China All Point to a Quietly Rising 45° Youth Group



Politics (Public Opinion within the Great Firewall):A “Three-Eyes Alliance” Among the United States, Japan, and South Korea Is On the Verge of Emerging


Finance and Business (Public Opinion within the Great Firewall):China’s Foreign Economic Relations May Now Be at a Historic Turning Point

Communist Party Secretary of Beijing Meets with Baidu’s Founder Represents a Significant Underlying Trend
 
Feature Story:
How to Evaluate the Criticism that “China’s Overseas Pro-Democracy Movement is Full of Factions and Internal Struggles”?Wang Dan – Radio Free Asia Opinion – April 28, 2023
Wang Dan, Leader of the 1989 Pro-democracy Movement/Director of Dialogue China Think Tank (Reuters)When it comes to the overseas Chinese pro-democracy movement, which has persisted for three to four decades, there has been long-standing and overarching criticism on the Internet that claims that the movement is “full of factions and rife with serious internal struggles, unable to unite or unify, and therefore it has achieved nothing.” As a member of the overseas Chinese pro-democracy movement, I welcome criticism and corrections from outsiders. But I also have a responsibility to prevent the spread of such disinformation, to clarify the facts, and to explain the situation according to what I know. I cannot say that such criticism is totally unfounded, but I think there are eight issues that need to be considered before accepting such criticism.

First, many people are merely repeating rumors that they have heard from others and things that they have not witnessed on their own. They are not familiar with many pro-democracy activists, and many of these critics have simply read some news on Twitter or other social media. The problem is that there is so much false information on the Internet nowadays that it is impossible to distinguish fact from fiction. Can such information be used as a sufficient and rigorous basis for making judgment?

Second, are there any internal disagreements within the overseas pro-democracy movement? Of course there are. But if we look at each case objectively, we will find that many of the disagreements are merely disputes among individuals or even conflicts due to personality differences. Descriptions of such individual conflicts as being characteristic of the entire overseas democracy movement is not only an oversimplification but also confusion about the facts. 

Third, with respect to the so-called “internal struggles,” that is, quarrels or even discord among movement members:  Are such struggles a problem only within China’s overseas pro-democracy movement? In fact, such struggles exist not only in political groups but in any group. Even in a group as small as a family, for example, couples also often quarrel and bicker with one another.  Amongst countries, especially the developed democracies, partisan confrontations can be quite serious. But, to some extent, such confrontations can also be considered the embodiment of democracy because it is only through confrontation that there will be mutual supervision and checks and balances, and it is only differences of opinion can policy be improved. But in an authoritarian system, like that in China,, the slightest disagreement can quickly become a matter of life and death. Simply put, it is common for there to be different opinions, quarrels, and even splits within any organization.

Fourth, because there are different interest groups within the overseas Chinese pro-democracy movement, it is said that it is “full of factions.” But is this really a problem? In analyzing political issues, there are inevitably differences of opinion, varying positions, and diverse approaches, and these are manifested in different combinations of people with different views. But this is a normal phenomenon in democratic politics. In contrast, a loose coalition of different political views forced to form an organization under one leader, with one voice, and with one platform, regardless of whatever good intentions there may be, is characteristic of the long-standing traditional Chinese culture and the culture of the Chinese Communist Party. In such a system, everything must remain unified. But isn’t such unity merely the result of brainwashing? “Factions” are not necessarily a bad thing. What should be criticized in the overseas Chinese pro-democracy movement is whether the various interest groups can abide by the rules of democracy and, despite different perspectives, work together toward a common goal.

Fifth, the so-called overseas Chinese pro-democracy movement is actually an extremely broad label, and no one is qualified to say what is and what is not representative of movement. But this has led many people to be identified as being loosely affiliated with the movement, even if they themselves do not see themselves in such a way. When outsiders issue criticisms, it is important to recognize that if we cannot provide an accurate definition of the overseas pro-democracy movement or come up with a clear standard, then we should not casually treat the “overseas pro-democracy movement” as a single entity. Making such judgments is in fact not very rigorous.

Sixth, overseas pro-democracy movements are in general vulnerable to criticism and even smear campaigns as they operate in a free world and in an environment of free public opinion. When Chinese go overseas, many do not dare to openly criticize the Chinese Communist Party, but they have no such fear when it comes to criticizing the overseas pro-democracy movement as while abroad  they can fully enjoy their freedom of speech. This is why we often see so much criticism of the overseas Chinese pro-democracy movements on social media such as Twitter. Because it is safe and convenient to criticize the overseas Chinese pro-democracy movement, it makes the problems of the movement seem disproportionately large.

Seventh, there are indeed some people or incidents within the overseas Chinese pro-democracy movement that deserve to be criticized or even denounced. However, when evaluating the overseas pro-democracy movement as a whole, outsiders often only see the controversial figures and they overlook the fact that there are still many members of the movement who have persisted in their activism for decades and have never given up, have never engaged in public quarrels, and have never become involved in inter-organizational conflicts.  They conscientiously continue their work to the extent possible, but these people are not often seen by the outside world because they maintain a low profile.  I have known many such people over the past several decades. So, in the future, I hope that any criticism of the movement will be based on a more comprehensive understanding of the specific people involved rather than merely generalizing about so-called “internal power struggles.” Such rumor-mongering creates a very distorted understanding of the overseas pro-democracy movement.

Eighth, I still must point out that the Chinese pro-democracy movement should remain self- critical and listen to and accept valid external criticisms with an open mind.  However, if the unreasonableness of such criticism persists, we must not fail to clarify the facts. This is not the same thing as being willing to listen to criticism.

Finally, I believe that the future of democratization in China is not a matter for the overseas Chinese pro-democracy movement alone to accomplish, but rather it is a task for all Chinese people, regardless of where they are. External criticism of the overseas pro-democracy movement is certainly a form of political participation, but what China needs much more than criticism is constructive participation by everyone and honest acts of self-criticism.  If we don’t do anything and just sit back and judge others, remaining satisfied with merely making comments on a keyboard, there can be no progress. 

In short, I am defending the pro-democracy movement. Not for selfish reasons, but because I want to create a good political atmosphere to fight together against our common enemy, the Chinese Communist Party. As the saying goes, we should start with ourselves. Talk less about others, look more critically at ourselves, and then change will happen. But all such change should start with a correct understanding of the criticism of the pro-democracy movement by outside observers.Think Tank Opinion:
Twenty Years of a Return to Farming, Twenty Years of a Return to ForestsEditorial Board – Dialogue China Briefing – June 1, 2023
People with Little Common Sense Believe There Are Experts Growing Rice on  Mountains: That This Is Packaged as Science Is Pure Nonsense (Visual China Group)People in the western Chinese city of Chengdu recently discovered that the nearly completed Tianfu Greenway encircling the city has been massively deforested, and that the ¥34.1 billion, 100,000-acre green space has overnight been reclaimed and replanted as farmland.

What is even more surprising is that such occurrences are not private acts of destruction but rather part of a government-initiated campaign to “return the forests to farmland.” In 2016 Xi Jinping proposed: “Store grain in land and store grain in technology.” Thereafter, he continually spoke about food security, saying that it is illegal to occupy arable land to grow grass and trees. The Central Government’s No. 1 Document for 2023 also places special emphasis on stabilizing the production and supply of food and important agricultural products.

Does China lack food supplies? At a press conference on May 11, 2023, Mr. Cong Liang, director general of the National Food and Material Reserves Administration, declared that China had achieved nineteen consecutive bumper cereal harvests. The self-sufficiency rate of staple grains has reached 100 percent, with per capita grain possession of 480 kilograms, significantly higher than the internationally recognized safety line of 400 kilograms.  

Data show that China’s annual food production is close to 700 million tons, while demand is about 800 million tons, thus requiring a steady annual import of more than 100 million tons of food from abroad. During the past few decades, this gap has been balanced by international trade, so food security has never been a serious issue.
Grain production and import in China (unit: 10,000 tons)
Green Cylinder: domestic grain production
Orange cylinder: grain import
Source: cngrain.comIn reality, the shortfall of over 100 million tons is primarily attributed to the feed industry. Countries such as the United States, Brazil, Russia, Ukraine, Canada, and Australia, known for their significant grain production, employ mechanized production methods, resulting in high yields and low costs. Importing grain from these countries proves to be cheaper than producing grain domestically. Therefore, for livestock farmers in China, importing food is a cost-effective choice. 

If this is the case, then why has there been a sudden rush to return the forests to farmland in China?

First, in recent years, due to the poor international trade environment, China’s foreign exchange reserves have been falling and the Chinese Communist Party has sought to reduce foreign exchange outflows by suppressing food imports.

Second, Xi Jinping fears a “stranglehold” by the West.. In his view, food security is equivalent to regime security. Therefore, he hopes to ensure a stable supply of food through self-sufficiency.  As a result, governments in various regions have responded enthusiastically to Xi Jinping’s call that “The Chinese people must hold their own rice bowls in their own hands.” They have been cutting down trees in a rush to achieve self-sufficiency in food production. 

Last, since last year’s invasion of Ukraine, Europe and the United States have imposed embargoes on Russian food, energy, and industrial goods, causing commodity shortages and an economic crisis in Russia. This has deeply frightened Xi Jinping. According to economist Li Hengqing, director of the American think tank, the Informatics and Strategies Institute, the move to return the forests to farmland appears to be a precautionary measure due to a potential deterioration in international trade.  But in fact, it is really a preparation for war. An invasion of Taiwan has always been foremost in Xi’s mind, and he is making preparations to move from the current economic crisis to a military confrontation with the West. The policy of returning the forests to farmland in reality is preparation for the proverbial “rainy day,” that is, war with the West.

Li Hengqing has also pointed out that there have never been any satisfactory results from decisions made by the Chinese Communist Party since its rise to power. Instead, its decisions have resulted in great famines and much social unrest. And this time too, Xi Jinping’s return to farmland is also destined to end in a bellicose drama, perhaps even a tragedy.

In fact, during the past several decades what has really destroyed much of China’s arable land area is not trees and forests but rather construction and land development. It is the developers who have been seizing the fertile land around the cities, while most of the so-called “reforestation” has been carried out on remote and barren land that is not easy to cultivate. Therefore, returning the forests to farmland will not result in a large increase in food production.

In addition, such a return to farmland will result in much ecological damage. After the 1998 floods in China, the Chinese Communist Party began proposing “planting trees in the mountains and returning farmland to forests.” Party leaders, from Jiang Zemin to Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao, all repeatedly and publicly emphasized environmental protection and adherence to the policy of returning the farmland to forests. But within less than thirty years, the return of farmland to forests ended abruptly and took a 180-degree turn. As a result, the ecological environment is bound to continue to deteriorate.

Finally, the unsustainable nature of such agricultural policies will deprive farmers of their livelihood. After implementation of the reform and opening-up policy, the eastern regions of China gradually became prosperous, and farmers began diversifying their crops. Most farmers chose to plant high-profit crops such as fruit and tea trees. A sudden large-scale deforestation will result in many farmers not reaping any returns from their hard-earned capital. There are farmers in Huanggang, Hubei province, who have reported on the Internet that the local government dug up the village’s paved road and filled it with soil in order to grow crops. 

Forty years ago, China implemented its one-child policy, but today it is encouraging people to have three children. Twenty years ago, the entire country was promoting a return of farmland to forests, but now it has started to return the forests to farmland. Current affairs commentator Shen Liang has noted that the history of the Chinese Communist Party is marked by such blindness. From land reform to socialist transformation, from the Great Leap Forward to the Great Famine, from the catastrophic decade of the 1966–76 Cultural Revolution and followed by implementation of the policy of reform and opening-up, for 75 years the Chinese Communist Party has been using the Chinese people as guinea pigs for its social experiments.

Regarding the absurd current reversal in policy by the Chinese Communist Party, Li Hengqing has pointed out that because the West is characterized by free economies, the Chinese government cannot exert pressure on the West through the quantity of price of grain exports. The Western governments are now on the right track in terms of their policies toward China, and the containment of China is beginning to take effect. Li has suggested that the Western governments should maintain their current pressure on China, remaining patient and taking their time so as not to give China any chance to ease the situation. Finally, Li has expressed a hope that the Western media will give more coverage to revealing the truth about the Chinese Communist Party so that these truths will reach China and accelerate an awakening of the people. Policy (Public Opinion within the Great Firewall):
Most of China’s Agricultural Counties in the Midwest May Become Permanent Agricultural Counties
An Yongjun – Cultural Crossroads – April 17, 2023A County Funeral Procession in Zhejiang Province During the Pandemic (Reuters)Summary:
This article points out that county-level cities in China offer a low-cost version of a modern lifestyle and cost-effective urbanization, making them the preferred choices for rural residents, especially young people, to pursue urbanization. However, due to the lack of local employment in the vast central and western agricultural counties, farmers, even if they purchase houses in the cities, still must seek employment outside, thus making it difficult to achieve comprehensive family-based urbanization. Therefore, the current urbanization in the central and western agricultural counties is a kind of “transitional urbanization.” This article suggests that the state must strategically reconsider the development orientation of the agricultural counties in central and western China, with the primary function of the permanent agricultural counties being the provision of public services and offering rural residents better cost-effectiveness in public services compared to that in the large cities.(Read The Original TextPolicy (Public Opinion within the Great Firewall):
Three Major Events That Recently Occurred in China All Point to a Quietly Rising 45° Youth Group
Xing Tingting – Exploration and Contention – April 10, 2023
On February 19, 2023, young people were burning incense and praying at a Lama temple in Beijing. (Getty Images)Summary:
Today the young generation in China has high expectations, but with the dramatic changes taking place, the young generation is also facing many challenges. They have been described as “internally convoluted,” “lying flat,” or “Buddhist.” Nowadays, there are even problems such as “queuing up to burn incense,” “cyber security,” and “youth depression.” Currently, the ways and logic of social development and distribution have undergone significant changes. The tensions between rapid development and comprehensive transformation and between collectivism and individualism are reflected in this generation of youth. When this generation of young people, who experienced prosperity in their youth and underwent trials and tribulations in their early adulthood, become the backbone of society, they will witness the development of the nation and a reshaping of their own personal values. (Read The Original TextPolitics (Public Opinion within the Great Firewall):
A “Three-Eyes Alliance” Among the United States, Japan, and South Korea Is on the Verge of Emerging
Zhang Chi – Scholars of International Relations and Diplomacy – April 24, 2023
The U.S., Japan, and South Korea At the NATO Summit in Madrid, June 29, 2022. (Newsis News Agency [South Korea])Summary:
The United States, Japan, and South Korea have recently been using the deteriorating regional security situation and the threat from North Korea as excuses to hold several large-scale joint military exercises and to establish a cooperative intelligence organization, called the “Three-Eyes Alliance,” to expand the scope of intelligence sharing. However, further development of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance still faces several challenges. On the one hand, the recent easing of relations between South Korea and Japan has been superficial, and their deep-seated mutual distrust and even confrontation have remained frozen in time. On the other hand, it is difficult to reconcile the conflicting roles of the United States–Korea alliance. The Biden administration’s response to the transfer of wartime operational command, a symbol of military sovereignty, has been tepid, and further conflicts between the United States and South Korea on related issues cannot be ruled out in the future.(Read The Original TextFinance and Business (Public Opinion within the Great Firewall):
China’s Foreign Economic Relations May Now Be at a Historic Turning PointZhi Guzi – Zhigu Trending – April 19, 2023
In April 2023, the Six-Day Third China International Consumer Goods Exposition Was Held in Haikou City, Hainan. (Xinhua News Agency) Summary:
There are a number of interesting points in the surprising import and export figures for the first quarter of 2023. First, China’s foreign trade received a unexpected report card, with the total value of China’s imports and exports of goods in the first quarter of 2023 at ¥9.89 trillion, up 4.8 percent year on year, among which, exports grew 8.4 percent year on year and imports grew 0.2 percent year on year. Second, the United States, once China’s largest and long-time export destination, continues to decline in status. On a monthly basis, China’s exports to the United States declined for eight consecutive months, leaving the amount of exports to the U.S. now behind those from ASEAN and the EU. Third, China has remained steadfast with Western countries other than the United States. For example, Canada’s exports to China have increased by a cumulative 64 percent, surpassing all other countries. Fourth, the Southeast Asian figures prove not only the value of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership but also its fundamental role in China’s foreign trade. Among the Southeast Asian countries, Singapore has become one of China’s largest sources of foreign investment. Fifth, Russia and the Middle East have shown the potential to become fundamental pillars in China’s foreign trade. In terms of trade volume, Russia has already surpassed Germany and this year it is expected to rank after only the United States, Japan, and Korea.(Read The Original TextFinance and Business (Public Opinion within the Great Firewall):
Communist Party Secretary of Beijing Meets with Baidu’s Founder Represents a Significant Underlying Trend 
Xiao Xiang – Xiao Xiang Experience – April 24, 2023
On April 14, 2023, Yin Li, Secretary of Beijing Municipal Communist Party Committee, visited Baidu, accompanied by Baidu’s founder, Andrew Li (Beijing Daily)Summary:
On April 14, 2023, secretary of the Beijing Municipal Communist Party Committee conducted investigation and research in Haidian district. During the visit, the only company he visited was Baidu. He was primarily interested in two things: the display of artificial intelligence technology applications and demonstration of an unmanned vehicle simulation system. In fact, not only in Beijing but now across the country, a small phalanx of local politicians investigating artificial intelligence enterprises is emerging. Artificial intelligence can seamlessly converge with the top-level design of “Digital China” and provide new leverage for the development of advanced manufacturing industries. The artificial intelligence industry is more innovative than that of e- commerce and new energy vehicles. Currently, various regions are eagerly preparing, establishing funds, attracting industry giants, and engaging in fierce competition for the AI industry, signaling the beginning of an inter-regional race in this field.(Read The Original Text
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