How Does the United States Counter China’s Modern United Front Strategy? A Case Study of Taiwan’s Response to Cognitive Warfare Threats

How Does the United States Counter China’s Modern United Front Strategy? A Case Study of Taiwan’s Response to Cognitive Warfare Threats

Author: Can Xiong, Syracuse University

I. Introduction

China’s modern United Front strategy has evolved into a sophisticated tool for exerting influence abroad, particularly through cognitive warfare tactics that blend propaganda, disinformation, and social media manipulation. This approach has proven especially relevant in Taiwan, a frontline state facing continuous political and psychological pressure from Beijing. As cognitive warfare continues to shape international conflicts, understanding China’s methods and Taiwan’s responses provides valuable insights for democratic nations, particularly the United States.

Cognitive warfare represents an emerging battlefield where state and non-state actors attempt to manipulate perceptions and influence decision-making using digital platforms, misinformation campaigns, and psychological tactics. China’s cognitive warfare efforts are deeply embedded in its United Front Work, a strategy historically used to expand influence and co-opt foreign political, media, and business elites. Taiwan, with its democratic system and independent political identity, serves as a prime target for these operations, making it an invaluable case study for analyzing China’s broader tactics. By examining how Taiwan counters these influence operations, the United States and other democracies can develop effective countermeasures to protect their own institutions from similar threats.

The stakes are particularly high given China’s increasing assertiveness in global affairs. Recent events demonstrate how cognitive warfare can destabilize democratic institutions without conventional military engagement. For example, China’s attempts to influence Taiwan’s 2024 presidential elections through coordinated disinformation campaigns highlight the urgent need for effective countermeasures.

Taiwan’s experience is not unique. Other democracies have similarly come under coordinated influence operations by authoritarian regimes. For instance, Russia has actively deployed disinformation campaigns targeting electoral systems and public opinion in Europe and North America. During the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 2017 French election, Russian actors spread false narratives via social media, often exploiting existing societal divisions. In Germany, the domestic intelligence agency (BfV) has repeatedly warned of Russian attempts to undermine political cohesion through media manipulation and cyber activity. In Eastern and Central Europe, such as Hungary and Serbia, pro-Kremlin and pro-Beijing narratives are propagated through friendly media outlets and political elites. These global cases underscore that cognitive warfare is not a regional phenomenon but a widespread challenge facing all open societies.

This paper examines China’s cognitive warfare as part of its United Front strategy, evaluates Taiwan’s responses, and explores how the U.S. and other democracies can adapt similar strategies to counteract these threats. The focus will be on identifying effective policy measures and institutional frameworks that can mitigate China’s influence in democratic societies. Given the transnational nature of cognitive warfare, understanding Taiwan’s experience is crucial for crafting comprehensive strategies to defend against foreign manipulation.

II. Theories of Cognitive and Information Warfare

Conceptual Framework and Evolution

Cognitive warfare manipulates public perception through propaganda, misinformation, and targeted digital campaigns. Unlike traditional military engagements, cognitive warfare seeks long-term psychological influence over populations, exploiting political divisions and eroding trust in institutions. This form of warfare has evolved significantly in the digital age, transitioning from traditional propaganda to sophisticated, data-driven influence operations that leverage social media algorithms and artificial intelligence to maximize impact.

P.W. Singer and Emerson Brooking’s “LikeWar” emphasize the role of social media weaponization in modern conflicts, demonstrating how platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok serve as battlegrounds for information control. They argue that “social media has changed the nature of conflict and become a battlefield that everyone can join.”[1] Similarly, Thomas Rid’s “Active Measures” traces the historical development of information warfare tactics, illustrating how digital technologies have amplified their effectiveness by enabling unprecedented reach and precision in targeting specific demographics.[2]

Cognitive warfare operates on three interrelated levels:

1. Strategic level: Shaping long-term narratives about a nation’s identity, values, and place in the international order
2. Operational level: Influencing specific policy decisions and electoral outcomes
3. Tactical level: Spreading targeted disinformation to create immediate confusion or panic during critical events

This form of warfare is particularly effective in open societies, where freedom of expression and decentralized information networks make it easier for foreign actors to spread influence.

China’s Cognitive Warfare Approach

China’s cognitive warfare involves state-backed influence campaigns, amplification of divisive narratives, and AI-driven propaganda operations. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses digital platforms to disseminate misleading narratives and sway public opinion in targeted regions.

A notable example is TikTok, which has been flagged as a potential tool for CCP influence, particularly in the context of Taiwan. A 2022 study published in China Brief detailed how TikTok’s algorithm can be manipulated to promote pro-Beijing narratives while suppressing content critical of China’s policies.[3] Misinformation campaigns often focus on undermining trust in democratic governance, spreading false narratives about Taiwan’s elections, and portraying China as an inevitable hegemonic force.

In Taiwan, analysts have observed that TikTok’s recommendation algorithms disproportionately promote content that portrays Taiwan as unstable or culturally Chinese, while suppressing pro-independence or government-supportive content. A 2023 report from the Doublethink Lab noted coordinated campaigns on TikTok during election periods that amplified pro-KMT narratives while discrediting DPP candidates. The platform’s opaque moderation policies and lack of data transparency make it difficult for researchers to assess the full extent of algorithmic bias, compounding concerns about CCP influence.

The Taiwan Case: A Laboratory for Cognitive Warfare

Taiwan has faced continuous waves of state-backed disinformation, particularly during elections and military crises. These campaigns specifically target Taiwan’s younger voters with narratives questioning the viability of Taiwan’s democracy and promoting candidates perceived as more favorable to Beijing.

Reports highlight how China employs deepfake videos, misleading news reports, and fake social media accounts to spread confusion and weaken trust in Taiwan’s government. During Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election, deepfake videos purporting to show candidates making controversial statements went viral on Taiwanese social media platforms before being debunked by fact-checkers. These tactics are designed to exploit existing societal divisions and influence key political events.

Taiwan’s ability to counter these tactics provides critical lessons for other democracies facing similar threats from China. The theoretical understanding of cognitive warfare must inform practical responses, as Taiwan has demonstrated through its whole-of-society approach to countering foreign influence operations.

III. China’s Modern United Front Strategy

Institutional Structure and Strategic Objectives

The United Front Work Department (UFWD) operates as the CCP’s primary political influence apparatus, engaging in covert and overt operations to shape foreign policy discussions, infiltrate media, and establish pro-Beijing networks in democratic states. Under Xi Jinping, the UFWD has expanded its reach, integrating economic coercion, diplomatic engagement, and cognitive warfare into its strategy. The strategic goal is to weaken opposition to Beijing’s policies and create a more favorable global environment for Chinese interests.

According to Anne-Marie Brady’s influential study “Magic Weapons,” the UFWD has undergone significant restructuring since 2015, with Xi Jinping personally chairing the Central United Front Work Leading Small Group, elevating its importance in China’s foreign policy apparatus.[4] This institutional expansion has been accompanied by a more aggressive approach to manipulating foreign information environments.

The UFWD’s work is guided by several key strategic objectives:

1. Isolating Taiwan diplomatically and shaping international perceptions of cross-strait relations
2. Neutralizing criticism of China’s human rights record
3. Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative and other economic engagement programs
4. Advancing China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and elsewhere
5. Building a coalition of states supportive of China’s vision for a “new type of international relations”[5]

These objectives are pursued through a coordinated approach that combines traditional United Front tactics with modern cognitive warfare methods.

Operational Methods and Tools

China’s United Front efforts leverage a mix of political lobbying, economic incentives, and digital manipulation. The CCP funds think tanks, academic programs, and policymakers to promote pro-Beijing narratives while acquiring stakes in foreign media outlets to influence editorial policies.

Economic leverage is another key tool, as China uses trade agreements and investments as political bargaining tools to shape foreign governments’ stances on issues like Taiwan and human rights. For example, China has used economic pressure against countries that deepen ties with Taiwan.

Digital influence operations represent a growing component of China’s United Front work. These operations involve networks of social media accounts linked to Chinese state entities, designed to amplify pro-Beijing narratives and criticize perceived adversaries. These accounts operate across multiple platforms and languages, targeting specific demographic groups with tailored messaging.

Taiwan as a Testing Ground

Taiwan has served as a testing ground for China’s cognitive warfare and United Front tactics. Methods used in Taiwan—such as online disinformation campaigns and media infiltration—have been replicated in other democracies.

Case studies demonstrate how these tactics are adapted for different contexts:

1. Australia: China’s influence operations in Australia have focused on shaping policy positions related to the South China Sea and human rights issues. The establishment of Confucius Institutes and the cultivation of relationships with business and political elites mirror approaches first used in Taiwan.[6]
2. Africa: China’s United Front work in Africa combines infrastructure investment with media influence, providing both content and technical support to local outlets, ensuring favorable coverage of China’s activities.
3. European Union: In Europe, China has focused on elite capture and economic incentives to disrupt EU unity on issues like 5G infrastructure and human rights sanctions.

These tactics are adapted to local contexts but share the same fundamental objective: to shape narratives in ways that benefit Beijing while undermining democratic resilience. By understanding how these methods evolved in the Taiwan context, other democracies can better anticipate and counter similar influence operations in their own countries.

IV. Taiwan’s Response to China’s Cognitive Warfare

Government Institutional Responses

Taiwan has developed a multi-pronged defense against cognitive warfare, including cybersecurity enhancements to counter hacking and online disinformation. The government has established specialized units to coordinate across government agencies to monitor, analyze, and counter foreign disinformation campaigns.

The government has also introduced legislative measures to criminalize foreign political interference, recognizing that legal frameworks must evolve to address emerging threats. The Anti-Infiltration Act, passed in December 2019, specifically targets covert political activities carried out at the direction of “hostile external forces” and imposes penalties of up to five years imprisonment and fines of up to NT$10 million (approximately US$330,000) for violations.[7]

Taiwan’s democratic institutions have remained resilient despite sustained cognitive warfare attacks, thanks in part to proactive government policies and collaboration with civil society. The Central Election Commission has implemented enhanced verification procedures for campaign communications and voter information, reducing the impact of election-related disinformation.

Civil Society and Media Initiatives

Civil society plays a crucial role in countering misinformation. Initiatives like the Taiwan FactCheck Center and public-private partnerships actively debunk false narratives and educate citizens on media literacy. The Taiwan FactCheck Center has developed a network of volunteers who help identify and verify potential disinformation. The center’s work is complemented by grassroots initiatives like CoFacts, a collaborative fact-checking platform that operates through popular messaging applications like LINE (Taiwan’s most widely used messaging app).

Media literacy programs have been integrated into Taiwan’s education system at all levels. The Ministry of Education introduced digital literacy courses for students from elementary through high school, focusing on critical thinking skills and source verification.

Taiwan’s media outlets have also taken steps to identify and expose United Front activities, reducing their impact on public discourse. Major newspapers regularly publish investigative reports on Chinese influence operations, while public broadcaster Taiwan Public Television Service produces documentaries explaining these tactics to the general public.

These media literacy efforts include practical modules on identifying manipulated images, understanding algorithmic content curation, and distinguishing between credible and fake news sources. In high schools, for example, students are taught how to verify social media content through lateral reading techniques, and some classrooms run simulated “misinformation response drills.” These initiatives are designed not only to raise awareness but also to build habits of critical consumption among young citizens.

Figure 1: Support for Legislation to Ban CCP KOL Collaborations by Age Group (2024)

Figure 1 illustrates the variation in support for legislation banning collaborations with CCP-linked influencers (KOLs) across age groups in Taiwan. While the older population (45 and above) shows strong support for such legislation, younger respondents—particularly those aged 20–34—are more likely to oppose it. This generational gap highlights differing levels of concern or susceptibility to cognitive threats, underscoring the importance of tailored media literacy efforts. (source:TaipeiTimes)

Case Study: Response to Military Crisis Disinformation

During China’s military drills near Taiwan, the CCP launched a coordinated disinformation campaign, spreading rumors of an impending invasion to sow panic among civilians and weaken government credibility. Social media platforms were flooded with claims that PLA amphibious forces had been sighted off Taiwan’s western coast. These false reports were accompanied by manipulated images and videos purporting to show Chinese landing craft approaching Taiwan’s beaches.

Taiwan’s response demonstrated its evolved capabilities:

1. Rapid official communication: The Ministry of National Defense issued clarifications through multiple channels, including social media, official websites, and emergency text alerts.
2. Media cooperation: Major television networks interrupted regular programming to broadcast verified information about the actual scope of China’s exercises.
3. Digital forensics: Fact-checking organizations quickly analyzed the manipulated images and published detailed explanations of how they had been altered.
4. Civil society mobilization: Digital literacy groups mobilized volunteers to counter false information across various platforms.

By quickly countering these narratives with factual information, Taiwan’s government was able to mitigate their impact. This response underscores the importance of rapid and transparent communication in countering cognitive warfare.

Figure 2: Public Exposure and Response to Misinformation in Taiwan (2022–2024)

As shown in Figure 2, public exposure to misinformation in Taiwan has increased significantly from 2022 to 2024. However, this rise is accompanied by a growing recognition of the issue’s seriousness and increased use of fact-checking tools. These trends suggest a strengthening of societal resilience against information manipulation, thanks in part to civil society initiatives and public education campaigns.(source: Taiwan FactCheck Center)

Challenges and Limitations in Taiwan’s Response

While Taiwan has developed an impressive whole-of-society approach to counter cognitive warfare, several persistent challenges continue to undermine the effectiveness and sustainability of its defense.

First, Taiwan faces significant resource constraints. Unlike major powers with robust budgets for information security and strategic communications, Taiwan operates under fiscal limitations that affect the scalability of its counter-disinformation efforts. Cybersecurity teams and digital literacy programs often rely on short-term funding or volunteer labor, limiting long-term capacity.

Second, the fragmentation of Taiwan’s media landscape complicates message coordination. The highly competitive and politically polarized nature of Taiwanese media leads to inconsistent fact-checking standards and varying levels of public trust. Even when disinformation is debunked, corrective messaging may fail to reach certain audiences, especially in echo chambers dominated by partisan content.

Third, cognitive warfare operations exploit Taiwan’s internal social divisions. The longstanding cleavage between pro-independence and pro-unification camps provides fertile ground for Beijing’s manipulation, making disinformation more potent and harder to counter without being accused of political bias.

Fourth, legal and ethical boundaries create enforcement dilemmas. While the Anti-Infiltration Act criminalizes foreign interference, enforcement must balance democratic norms such as freedom of speech and press. The government is cautious about overstepping and being perceived as censorial, which can delay responses to hostile content.

Finally, some emerging forms of cognitive warfare are more difficult to detect and respond to. Covert influence through entertainment, lifestyle content, and key opinion leaders (KOLs) poses a new challenge. These “soft” channels subtly normalize pro-Beijing narratives without clear attribution, evading both public scrutiny and regulatory reach.

Together, these challenges highlight that while Taiwan is a leader in countering cognitive warfare, it remains a work in progress. Understanding these shortcomings provides a more balanced view for other democracies seeking to learn from Taiwan’s experience.

V. How the United States & Other Democracies Counter China’s Cognitive Warfare

Current U.S. Policy Framework

The U.S. has developed policy frameworks to counteract CCP influence, including sanctions on Chinese tech firms involved in disinformation campaigns, legislative efforts such as the Foreign Influence Transparency Act, and increased funding for counter-disinformation initiatives in democratic states. The Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) serves as the primary coordinating body for U.S. efforts to counter foreign disinformation.

Legislative responses have also evolved, with the Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act of 2016 establishing initial frameworks for addressing these challenges. More recent legislation aims to increase platform accountability for algorithmic amplification of harmful foreign content. However, partisan disagreements over implementation approaches have slowed legislative progress.

The U.S. has also Imposed targeted sanctions on entities Involved In cognitive warfare. These sanctions limit these companies’ access to U.S. markets and technologies, increasing the costs of engaging in cognitive warfare activities.

Comparative Approaches: U.S., Europe, and Democratic Asia

The U.S. and Europe have adopted varied approaches to countering China’s influence. While the EU focuses on media transparency laws, the U.S. emphasizes sanctions and intelligence-sharing. The European approach is exemplified by the European Democracy Action Plan and the Digital Services Act, which impose transparency requirements on platforms regarding content moderation and algorithmic amplification, while establishing a code of practice on disinformation.

Democratic nations in Asia have developed their own distinctive approaches:

1. South Korea: Established specialized units focusing on rapid identification and correction of false information.
2. Japan: Created positions focused on economic security, recognizing the nexus between economic influence and information manipulation.
3. Australia: Implemented the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme, requiring individuals and entities acting on behalf of foreign principals to register and disclose their activities.

Comparative analysis reveals strengths and weaknesses in each approach:

Figure 3: Comparative Approaches-U.S., Europe, and Democratic Asia

However, all these approaches recognize the need for greater coordination in addressing the challenges posed by cognitive warfare. Strengthening alliances with democratic nations in Asia, such as Taiwan and Japan, is a crucial step in building resilience against these tactics.

Policy Recommendations Based on Taiwan’s Experience

Policy recommendations for countering China’s cognitive warfare include enhancing cyber resilience through improved digital infrastructure, developing counter-narratives to neutralize Chinese propaganda, and stronger cooperation with Taiwan on cognitive warfare defense. Democracies must also invest in media literacy programs to help citizens recognize and resist disinformation.

Specific recommendations drawn from Taiwan’s experience include:

1. Institutional Coordination: Establish a dedicated cognitive warfare defense agency with clear authority to coordinate across government departments and with the private sector.
2. Public-Private Partnership: Create formal mechanisms for collaboration between government, tech companies, civil society, and academia, similar to Taiwan’s “whole-of-society” approach.
3. Platform Regulation: Implement targeted regulation requiring social media platforms to identify and label state-backed content, provide greater algorithmic transparency, and establish dedicated rapid response teams for election periods.
4. Media Literacy: Expand media literacy education in schools and for adult populations, with a particular focus on vulnerable demographics including seniors and communities with lower levels of digital access.
5. International Cooperation: Establish an international clearinghouse for sharing information about disinformation tactics, similar to cybersecurity threat sharing mechanisms, with Taiwan as a key partner given its frontline experience.

These recommendations balance the need for effective countermeasures with respect for democratic values like free speech and open information environments.

VI. Conclusion & Policy Recommendations

Summary of Findings

China’s cognitive warfare is a key component of its United Front strategy, with Taiwan serving as a primary testing ground. The evidence presented in this paper demonstrates that these operations are becoming increasingly sophisticated, leveraging emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and deepfakes to create more convincing and targeted disinformation. Taiwan’s experience shows that countering these threats requires a coordinated approach that spans government institutions, civil society, media organizations, and the education system.

Taiwan’s multi-layered defense strategy provides a model for other democracies to counteract foreign influence operations. Key elements of Taiwan’s approach include rapid response mechanisms, legal frameworks tailored to modern influence operations, public-private partnerships for fact-checking and media literacy, and transparent government communications during crises.

However, Taiwan’s experience also reveals critical limitations in countering authoritarian influence. Structural constraints, such as limited resources and a highly fragmented media ecosystem, present ongoing hurdles. Moreover, balancing effective regulation with democratic freedoms remains a difficult task. These challenges serve as cautionary lessons for other democracies, reminding policymakers that resilience against cognitive warfare is a continuous and adaptive process.

The resilience demonstrated by Taiwan underscores the importance of proactive measures in defending against cognitive warfare. Reactive approaches that rely solely on content removal or post-hoc corrections are insufficient against the volume and sophistication of modern influence operations. Instead, building societal resilience through education, institutional preparedness, and cross-sector collaboration offers more sustainable protection.

Comprehensive Recommendations for U.S. Policy

To counter these threats, the U.S. should implement a comprehensive strategy that incorporates lessons from Taiwan’s experience:

1. Expand security cooperation with Taiwan on cognitive defense strategies:
   • Establish a formal U.S.-Taiwan working group on cognitive warfare defense
   • Create a joint rapid response team for major disinformation events affecting both countries
   • Develop shared technical tools for detecting and analyzing influence operations
2. Increase public awareness campaigns to build societal resilience against disinformation:
   • Fund a national media literacy initiative targeting vulnerable demographics
   • Support civil society organizations engaged in fact-checking and digital literacy
   • Integrate critical information consumption into school curricula
3. Implement stronger digital platform regulations to limit foreign state-backed manipulation:
   • Require platforms to identify and label state-controlled media content
   • Mandate transparency for algorithmic amplification of political content
   • Establish liability protections for platforms that share data on influence operations with relevant authorities
4. Strengthen institutional capacity for cognitive warfare defense:
   • Elevate the Global Engagement Center within the State Department
   • Create a cross-agency coordination mechanism for rapid response to foreign influence operations
   • Establish regional cognitive warfare defense attachés at key embassies
5. Develop international standards and norms for the information space:
   • Lead efforts to establish international norms against state-sponsored disinformation
   • Create a coalition of democracies committed to information integrity
   • Fund international research on cognitive warfare detection and countermeasures

By taking these steps, democracies can strengthen their defenses against cognitive warfare and safeguard their political institutions from foreign influence. This strategy recognizes that cognitive warfare will remain a persistent challenge, requiring ongoing adaptation and investment. As technology continues to evolve, so too will the methods employed in influence operations. By building on Taiwan’s frontline experience and fostering international cooperation, the United States and its democratic partners can develop the resilience needed to withstand these evolving threats while preserving the open information environment that is essential to democratic governance.

Endnotes

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4. Brady, Anne-Marie. “Magic Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities under Xi Jinping.” Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center, 2017.
5. Groot, Gerry. “The CCP’s Grand United Front Abroad.” China Brief 19, no. 9 (2019).
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