To support us with a donation? Click here! China Briefing What China Is Reading Issue 98 – December 15, 2021 In This IssueThe articles shared here do not necessarily reflect the views of China Newsletter or Dialogue China. All articles sourced from WeChat public accounts unless otherwise noted. I. Dialogue China Select 1. Seeking New Means of Imposing Sanctions on the Chinese Communist Party 2. There Will Be No War in the Taiwan Strait in the Near Future. The “Taiwan Worry” is Not in the Present 3. List of Officials Involved in the “Zhang Zhan Case” II. Policy 4. Is the “Third Distribution” Common Prosperity or Robbing the Rich to Help the Poor? III. Politics 5. The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Current Situation in Afghanistan 6. “Eliminate English from the College Entrance Examination?” This Obscures the Real Problem Which is Getting Worse 7. The Communicative Order of Communist Party Leadership: The Operational Qualities of Political Communication in China in the Age of Social Media IV. Finance and Business 8. Evergrande is Not the Only Real Estate Conglomerate in Crisis. Is China’s Property Market on the Eve of a New Era? Dialogue China Opinions 1. Seeking New Means of Imposing Sanctions on the Chinese Communist Party Wang Dan – Radio Free Asia Commentary – November 22, 2021 In recent years – in response to the Chinese Communist Party’s implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong which has completely torn up the promise of “One Country, Two Systems” and suppressed the pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong, brutal suppression and ethnic genocide of Tibetans and Uighurs in Tibet and Xinjiang, and continued suppression of dissidents and other serious human rights violations in China – the United States and other Western countries have formulated and imposed a variety of sanctions. These sanctions are certainly helpful in limiting the Chinese Communist Party’s most extreme practices, but we must also objectively point out that, so far, the sanctions imposed by Western countries have basically focused on restricting the freedom of entry and travel of senior Chinese Communist Party officials and their profit-making enterprises. The actual deterrent effect is not significant. As for economic losses, they are only a drop in the ocean for those Communist Party officials who have been able to corruptly exploit state-owned property with impunity in China. Overall, these sanctions have not yet achieved the goal of truly combating the Chinese Communist Party’s human rights abuses. Therefore, formulating new and more powerful sanctions is an urgent issue that the international community must consider in its joint efforts to resist the Chinese Communist Party.   In my view, the Chinese Communist Party has long since ceased to be a rational ruling party with ideology as its cohesive force. The only force that can sustain the ruling caste is wealth. What matters most to Chinese Communist Party officials is how much wealth they can amass during their term in office and, more importantly, how they can protect that wealth, i.e., their vested interests. Therefore, the most effective sanction would be to start with the property of Chinese Communist Party officials who violate human rights.   Jia Kang, a Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference member and former director of the Ministry of Finance’s Institute of Finance, transmitted a message on August 3, 2019 stating that information released by Swiss banks on April 17, 2019 showed that hundreds of Chinese had deposits of up to ¥7.8 trillion at Union Bank of Switzerland, an average of ¥78 billion per person. There is no conclusive evidence to determine which specific individuals own these vast sums of wealth, but it is obviously a reasonable guess that most of them are corrupt Chinese Communist Party officials. WikiLeaks reports further confirm this. According to Wikileaks, senior Chinese Communist Party officials have about 5,000 accounts at Union Bank of Switzerland, nearly 70 percent of which are owned by central level State and Party authorities. In my opinion, this huge amount of overseas deposits by senior Chinese officials should be one of the new options for Western countries to sanction China.   As we know, Switzerland’s Federal Tax Administration (FTA) exchanged financial account information with 96 countries in 2021 in accordance with the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI)* agreement. Financial information on approximately 3.3 million bank accounts was provided to signatory states, and in exchange agreement members provided Switzerland with financial data on approximately 2.1 million bank accounts. This Automatic Exchange of Information agreement is a global standard for sharing financial information on bank accounts that China joined in 2017. The purpose of China’s initial accession was to monitor casinos in Macau, and keep track of the money laundering channels used by powerful Chinese interest groups with the ultimate goal of course using it against them in internal Communist Party power struggles. However, since China is already a member of this agreement and should fulfill its obligations, a more powerful sanction would be to cooperate and obtain information on the overseas assets of senior Chinese officials. This could be revealed at an opportune time, or the overseas assets of Chinese officials involved in human rights violations could be frozen. Those Chinese Communist Party officials who equate money with life will be concerned about the safety of their overseas assets and feel restrained. This will deter them even more than restricting their travel to Western countries. * The Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) between tax authorities regarding global financial accounts was developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2014. Its purpose is to combat tax evasion.   In addition, although common Chinese people dare not directly challenge the powerful Party-State machinery, as more and more of the Chinese Communist Party’s top officials’ overseas assets are publicly revealed, and as more and more people learn the truth, the common people’s discontent – even if they dare not express it – will gradually accumulate in their hearts and minds. When it reaches a breaking point, it will be transformed into a force for change in China. Therefore, I think that Western countries should seriously consider this option in their future list of sanctions.【Back to Top】 Dialogue China Opinions 2. There Will Be No War in the Taiwan Strait in the Near Future. The “Taiwan Worry” is Not in the Present Hu Ping – Radio Free Asia Commentary – November 8, 2021 Recently, war clouds have been gathering over the Taiwan Strait. The question of whether the Chinese Communist Party will invade Taiwan has once again become a hot topic of conversation. Based on my many years of observation and analysis of cross-strait relations, I believe that at this current stage the Chinese Communist Party will not attack Taiwan. The reasons are:   1. The Chinese Communist authorities know very well that the people of Taiwan reject the PRC’s “one country, two systems” unification plan. The Taiwanese people have long argued: “Accepting ‘one country, two systems’ would mean that what we already have will become what you – the Communist Party – generously grant us, and what you – the Communist Party – can take away at any time. The people of Taiwan – who already enjoy freedom and democracy – are not willing to return to having an autocratic emperor ruling over us.   2. The Chinese Communist Party knows very well that peaceful unification is impossible because the people of Taiwan do not accept “one country, two systems.” The only possibility for unification is for force to be used. But this stage is not the right opportunity to attempt to unify by force. The Chinese Communist Party also knows very well that the people of Taiwan have a strong desire for independence. Therefore, at this stage, the Chinese Communist Party is mainly concerned with preventing independence rather than promoting unification.   3. At this stage, why has the Chinese Communist Party not used military force to try to compel unification with Taiwan? The answer is: the United States. The Chinese Communist Party is worried about the involvement of the United States. The Chinese Communist Party believes that the United States is the biggest obstacle to forceful unification with Taiwan. Once the Chinese Communist Party uses military force to try to unify with Taiwan, the United States – in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act – is likely to send military troops to assist in Taiwan’s defense, and it is likely that the Chinese Communist Party will not be able to win the war. Even if they can win, the cost would be too great.   4. The more important point to consider is – time. Whose side will time be on? If the Chinese Communist Party believes that it will become more difficult to unify Taiwan with the passage of time, then it may decide to invade Taiwan by military force now, regardless of the risks involved. But if the Chinese Communist Party believes that time is on its side, at this stage it may decide to play a waiting game. According to the Chinese Communist Party’s smug calculation, in another 5 to 10 years China’s state and military power will have continued to increase, and the United States will no longer be able to defend Taiwan.   It is true that for more than 40 years, successive United States administrations have stood firm on their commitment to defend Taiwan. But the question is, is that likely to change in the future? This depends on the growth and decline of the actual strength of the United States and China over the next five to ten years. This requires us to commit ourselves to raise international awareness of Taiwan’s situation. The more attention Taiwan can attract from the international community, the more it can enhance its security. More importantly, we must vigorously promote change in mainland China itself, and try to accelerate its liberalization and democratization. In the final analysis, whether or not mainland China can embark on the road to freedom and democracy in the near future is not only a matter of personal interest for the people of mainland China, but also for the people of Taiwan and the whole world.【Back to Top】 Dialogue China Opinions 3. List of Officials Involved in the “Zhang Zhan Case” La Qingdan – China Dialogue – December 15, 2021 This list is provided by China Dialogue, and is recommended for inclusion on the human rights violators sanctions list.   Born on September 2, 1983 in Xianyang, Shaanxi Province, Zhang Zhan has a master’s degree in finance from Southwest University of Finance and Economics in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, and worked as an executive in a financial firm in Shanghai’s Pudong New District. In recent years Zhang became active in addressing social issues, and quit her high paying job to devote herself to the cause of defending human rights.   On January 23, 2020, Wuhan – a city with a population of more than 10 million people – was suddenly locked down, and an unprecedented “war” against a viral epidemic began. On February 1, 2020, Zhang Zhan went to the epidemic area to eyewitness document the events of the first plague of the century. On May 14, 2020, Zhang Zhan was arrested by the Shanghai police in a cross-border raid.   In Shanghai’s Pudong Detention Center, Zhang Zhan began a hunger strike that lasted for more than six months. She was subjected to fierce punishment: months of force feeding by tube, leg irons and 24-hour hand cuffs. Her hunger strike caused severe malnutrition and reduced her weight to less than 40 kilograms [88 pounds] for a woman nearly 180 centimeters [five feet nine inches] tall. Under these dire circumstances, Zhang Zhan still maintains her innocence and refuses to eat normally, thus protesting against what she considers her illegal detention and prosecution.   Responsible Person 1: Liao Guoxun Full Name: Liao Guoxun Work Unit: Shanghai Municipal Political and Legal Committee Position: Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee (February – August 2020) Place of Origin: Chengdu, Sichuan Province ID Number: 522601196302090030   Responsible Person 2: Yu Shaoliang Full Name: Yu Shaoliang Work Unit: Shanghai Municipal Political and Legal Committee Position: Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee (October 2020 – Present) Place of Origin: Zanhuang, Hebei Province ID Number: 13010219640726031X   Responsible Person 3: Gong Dao’an Full Name: Gong Dao’an Work Unit: Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau Position: Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau Chief (June 2017 – September 2020) Place of Origin: Li County, Hunan Province ID Number: 422423196410280054 (already entered on the White List) Relative: [Mistress] Yang Ye (310107197911273240)   Responsible Person 4: Shu Qing Full Name: Shu Qing Work Unit: Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau Position: Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau Chief (December 2020 – Present) Place of Origin: Qingzhou, Shandong Province ID Number: 310107196410061317 Relative: [Wife] An Hairong (650104197005190712), [Son] Shu Andong (650104197005190712)   Responsible Person 5: Zhang Bencai Full Name: Zhang Bencai Work Unit: Shanghai People’s Procuratorate Position: Prosecutor General, Shanghai People’s Procuratorate (January 2016 – Present) Place of Origin: Linyi, Shandong Province ID Number: 37012119670518745X   Responsible Person 6: Liu Xiaoyun Full Name: Liu Xiaoyun Work Unit: Shanghai Higher People’s Court Position: President, Shanghai Higher People’s Court (January 2018 – Present) Place of Origin: Yanjin, Henan Province ID Number: 410105196102142212   Responsible Person 7: Huang Baokun Full Name: Huang Baokun Work Unit: Shanghai State Security Bureau Position: Bureau Chief, Shanghai State Security Bureau (April 2020 – Present) Place of Origin: Longyou, Zhejiang Province ID Number: 330702196301210410   Responsible Person 8: Li Zelong Full Name: Li Zelong Work Unit: Shanghai Pudong New Area Political and Legal Committee Position: Secretary of Shanghai Pudong New Area Political and Legal Committee (already transferred) Place of Origin: Hefei, Anhui Province ID Number: 340111196810263532   Responsible Person 9: Zhang Lei Full Name: Zhang Lei Work Unit: Shanghai Pudong New Area Political and Legal Committee Position: Secretary of the Shanghai Pudong New Area Political and Legal Committee (October 2021 – Present) Place of Origin: Zhuji, Zhejiang Province ID Number: 310109197509200812   Responsible Person 10: Wu Jinshui Full Name: Wu Jinshui Work Unit: Shanghai Pudong New Area People’s Court Position: President, Shanghai Pudong New Area People’s Court (August 2019 – Present) Place of Origin: Tongcheng, Anhui Province ID Number: 310112196708130013   Responsible Person 11: Yang Yujun Full Name: Yang Yujun Work Unit: Shanghai Pudong New Area People’s Procuratorate Position: Prosecutor General, Shanghai Pudong New Area People’s Procuratorate (February 2017 – May 2021) Place of Origin: Yancheng, Jiangsu Province ID Number: 310105196601300832   Responsible Person 12: Xu Changhua Full Name: Xu Changhua Work Unit: Pudong Branch, Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau Position: Bureau Chief, Pudong Branch, Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau Place of Origin: Gaoyu, Jiangsu Province ID Number: 310108196106202855   Responsible Person 13: Huang Xiangqing Full Name: Huang Xiangqing Work Unit: Shanghai First Intermediate People’s Court Position: President, Shanghai First Intermediate People’s Court Place of Origin: Jiangling, Hubei Province ID Number: 422421196312111617   Responsible Person 14: Xu Jingui Full Name: Xu Jingui Work Unit: Shanghai People’s Procuratorate, First Branch Position: Prosecutor General, Shanghai People’s Procuratorate, First Branch (February 2016 – Present) Place of Origin: Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province ID Number: 31011519640101309X   Responsible Person 15: Ma Chaojie Full Name: Ma Chaojie Work Unit: Pudong New District People’s Court Position: Full-time Member of the Trial Committee, Higher People’s Court Second Level Judge Place of Origin: Pudong District, Shanghai ID Number: 310105196606260059   Responsible Person 16: Chen Gang Full Name: Chen Gang Work Unit: First Procuratorate Department of Shanghai Pudong New District People’s Procuratorate Position: Prosecutor General, First Procuratorate Department of Shanghai Pudong New District People’s Procuratorate Place of Origin: Pudong District, Shanghai ID Number: 310101197506103215   Responsible Person 17: Wang Meiling Name: Wang Meiling Work Unit: Pudong New District People’s Court Position: Judge, Pudong New District People’s Court Place of Origin: Pinghu County, Jiaxing Municipality, Zhejiang Province ID Number: 310224196504280029   Responsible Person 18: Chen Wei Name: Chen Wei Work Unit: Pudong New District People’s Court Position: Judge, Pudong New District People’s Court Place of Origin: Shanghai ID Number: 310102198704071614   Responsible Person 19: Wu Qi Name: Wu Qi Work Unit: Shanghai Municipal Prison Administration Position: Shanghai Municipal Prison Administration, Bureau Chief (September 2014), Communist Party Secretary (November 2018)   Place of Origin: Xian, Shaanxi Province ID Number: 310106196301250876   Responsible Person 20: Chen Jianhua Name: Chen Jianhua Work Unit: Shanghai Women’s Prison Position: Shanghai Women’s Prison, Communist Party Secretary, Warden (position held since at least 2016, but in service during Zhang Zhan case and while serving her sentence) Place of Origin: Zhejiang Province ID Number: 310110196601174689【Back to Top】 Policy 4. Is the “Third Distribution” Common Prosperity or Robbing the Rich to Help the Poor? Tang Min – Southern Metropolis Observer – November 10, 2021 Why Read This? The primary stage of socialism in China may take hundreds of years, and the promotion of “common prosperity” may take even longer than that. In this process, it is important to avoid getting bogged down in the mistaken concepts mentioned earlier. Although the third distribution* in China is only in its infancy, it can play a special and important role in addressing the multi-dimensional challenges of common prosperity. If we mobilize more people in society, and make good use of the role of public welfare philanthropic organizations supported by the third distribution, we can better promote common prosperity. * The “Three Distributions” [三次分配] is a concept put forward by the Chinese economist Li Yining. The first distribution is the market, based on the principle of ruthless efficiency. The second is the government’s emphasis on the principle of fairness, through taxation and social security expenditures. The third distribution – or redistribution – is through voluntary donations under the influence of moral force.（Read the full text） 【Back to top】 Politics 5. The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Current Situation in Afghanistan Xiao Bin – Statecraft – September 27, 2021 Why Read This? According to the published content of the 2021 Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO] Multilateral Security Cooperation Conference, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is not optimistic about the future security situation in the region and has basically maintained its previous position on Afghanistan. It is clear that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has no better measures to deal with the current situation in Afghanistan. Only after the situation in Afghanistan is stabilized will the Shanghai Cooperation Organization be able to participate constructively in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.（Read the full text） 【Back to top】 Politics 6. “Eliminate English from the College Entrance Examination?” This Obscures the Real Problem Which is Getting Worse Ma Jianguo, Li Long – Beijing Cultural Review – August 26, 2021 Why Read This? Recently, in the context of a new round of education reform represented by the “double reduction policy,” the idea of “eliminating English from the college entrance examination” has been circulating on the Internet. This article analyzes the basic historical logic of the internationalization trend and the changes in English education in China, as well as the ideological debate behind it. The author argues that there is no possibility of stopping English language learning, but that English language learning must correspond to the social development, academic ecology, and political culture of our country. Therefore, English language learning and its institutional provisions need to be adjusted in the context of political and economic development. * “Double reduction” refers to the effective reduction of the excessive burden of homework and off-campus training for students in compulsory education.（Read the full text） 【Back to top】 Politics 7. The Communicative Order of Communist Party Leadership: The Operational Qualities of Political Communication in China in the Age of Social Media Yu Shujing, Jing Xuemin – Beijing Cultural Review – October 23, 2021 Why Read This? Chinese political communication in the era of social media is profoundly influenced by “Order Culture,” focusing on the institutionalization of political communication, the consolidation of mainstream ideology, and the governance orientation of political communication. In the era of social media, Communist Party leadership is an important institutional force that determines the nature of political communication in China, the ruling party plays a leading role in Chinese political communication, and is a leader in maintaining the order of communication. On the whole, it is a communication that leads to the common governance of the state and society, a “representative” and “integrated” communication.（Read the full text） 【Back to top】 Finance and Business 8. Evergrande is Not the Only Real Estate Conglomerate in Crisis. Is China’s Property Market on the Eve of a New Era? Old Stinking Ninth Finance and Business – Sanlian Life Weekly – September 26, 2021 Why Read This? Over the past 20 years, China has pursued different models of real estate development at different stages of economic development. As China’s economy now enters a new period of development, a new real estate model is beginning to emerge. In the past, Hong Kong was a model of study, and an overly market-oriented real estate system was adopted. But in the future, China will gradually shift toward the models of Singapore and Germany, and gradually increase the level of government protections in the real estate market. With the arrival of a new era in China’s real estate market – when developers are starting to pay the price for past extreme aggressiveness – for individuals perhaps it is time to give up the fantasy of purchasing real estate to get suddenly rich.（Read the full text） 【Back to top】